Funding Liberty! Table of Contents
Funding Liberty!
Chapter 26
Carla Howell's 2000 Campaign
The Political Situation in Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Republican Party of 1999 was moribund. Important members of the State Republican Party, including the Boston City Committee chair and senior staff from the state committee headquarters, had recently changed party and registered Libertarian. Of the state offices, after the 1998 election the Republican Party retained only the Governorship. (The Lieutenant Governor is not separately elected.) In the three legislative branches, the Republicans did not have a single seat on the Governor's Council. The Republicans retained but 7 of the 40 State Senate seats, two dozen of the 160 State Representative positions, and not even one of the ten seats on the Massachusetts Congressional delegation. In 1998 most state legislators ran unopposed, including a few Republicans who faced no Democratic Party opposition.
While there are many reasons for the decadence of the Massachusetts Republican Party, much of the blame must be laid squarely at the door of its most two recent Republican ex-Governors, Bill Weld and Paul Cellucci. Each was an indefatiguable fund raiser, generating vast sums for Republican races. Unfortunately for their state party, the races in question were their own and the races of out-of-state Republican Presidential candidates. Weld and Cellucci kept the money for their own efforts, while down-ticket campaigns scrabbled for pennies. Down-ticket Republicans were routinely massively outspent by their Democratic opponents. By 1998, the Republican Party apparatus was a shambles. Weld paid a price for his well-known actions. He resigned from his Governorship when he was nominated by President Clinton to be Ambassador to Mexico. Republican Senator Jesse Helms blocked the nomination, slamming the door in Weld's face, in no small part because Helms had heard from Massachusetts Republicans how Weld had treated them.
What of Howell's opponent? Senator Edward Kennedy is the dean of the Democratic liberals in the Senate. In a heavily Democratic state, his family name gave him near-total immunity to electoral challenge. Even if the Republicans had had a credible candidate, which they did not, Kennedy was virtually certain of re-election.
At first it was rumored that one of the state's few Republican District Attorneys would run against Kennedy. Then independent African-American businessman Jack E. Robinson, III offered himself up as the candidate. Robinson left many Republicans with the impression that he would spend very substantial sums of his own money on his campaign. In fact, Robinson's campaign largely shut down after the September primary.
The Robinson campaign faced the lethal challenge that the state Republican Party failed to coalesce around his candidacy. Robinson got very little petitioning help from the Party apparatus. He collected barely enough signatures. His petitions were then challenged on separate grounds by supporters of the Massachusetts Democratic and Libertarian Parties. After a prolonged court battle, Robinson won his case and was placed on the September Primary Ballot. The Democratic challenge was by-the-book Massachusetts politics. The Libertarian challenge to his campaign sufficiently poisoned the well that Robinson publicly ruled out debating his Libertarian opponent.
By late Summer it was blindingly obvious that the Robinson Campaign was going down like the Titanic. The Republican Party had one last chance to save its position: "Sticker" (write-in) campaigns are well understood by Massachusetts voters. There were several hotly contested Republican primaries at the county level, raising vote totals among politically alert Republican voters. If in late August one of the few prominent Republicans in the state had announced that he was running a write-in campaign in the Primary for the Senate position, to protect down-ticket candidates from disaster, he might well have been able to capture the nomination. The Republican Party closed its eyes, leading to speculation that Governor Cellucci had promised Senator Kennedy a bye in the 2000 election, in exchange for the Senator's herculean efforts to arrange Federal support for pork-laden Massachusetts civil works projects, and perhaps in exchange for Kennedy's tacit support to Cellucci for a Federal appointive position..
Robinson was widely perceived as a political joke. Robinson was much more politically astute than most of his critics maintained. He had several potentially embarrassing incidents in his background, including a minor car accident and several acutely dissatisfied former girlfriends. Knowing that he faced an extremely hostile media environment in Boston, Robinson followed the recommended management practice: If there is bad news, get it out immediately because the leaks will kill you. The strategy was fundamentally successful. Robinson put out everything early. The anti-Republican segments of the Boston press were unable to stage an 'October Surprise' against Robinson's record.
Campaign 2000
After 1998, rumors began about a Howell U.S. Senate campaign, perhaps even a subsequent Presidential Campaign. Howell was certain to face a crowded field of candidates. The incumbent Senator was Teddy Kennedy, a Democratic liberal with decades of seniority in the U.S. Senate. A Republican challenger would presumably be found. Massachusetts has a history of third-party candidates running for U.S. Senate. In 1994, Libertarian Lauraleigh Dozier got 0.65% of the vote, while William A. Ferguson, Jr. of the Larouche Was Right Party received 0.21% of the vote. In 1996, Conservative Party candidate Susan Gallagher received 2.69% of the vote while Robert Stowe of the Natural Law Party received 0.28% of the vote.
Conservatives had recruited the well-known (at least in conservative Christian circles) Philip Lawler. They were virtually certain to have him on the ballot in 2000. Furthermore, in Massachusetts minor parties can use a single nominating paper for all of their statewide candidates, including President, Senator, and State officers. With a few strokes of the pen, any minor party can boost its vote totals by adding a U.S. Senate candidate as a running mate to its Presidential ticket. Green, Reform, Constitution, and Natural Law Parties would be petitioning for their Presidential candidates. If they understood the law, they were likely to run Senate candidates as well. Based on the historical record, at no time in 2000 could any rational informed person have expected the Massachusetts November ballot to show fewer than four U.S. Senate candidates. There were rumors in the Libertarian press that Howell would be in a 2-person race, with Ted Kennedy as her only opponent. These rumors never had a rational basis in fact. It was as sure as politics can be that Howell would have at least three opponents.
In the end, Howell faced Kennedy, Robinson, Lawler, Dale Friedgen (Natural Law), and Philip Hyde. Lawler ran a modest campaign, though his radio ads attacking Robinson and Howell and ignoring Kennedy were heard in much of central and Western Massachusetts. He finished with 1.7% of the vote, which probably represents the rock-solid core Conservative/Constitution Party voter base in Massachusetts. Friedgen had almost no support for his campaign. Hyde got few votes, and was a genuine eccentric. In Europe, Hyde's ideas on alleviating unemployment would place him in the mainstream left wing of the political spectrum.
Why was Howell supported by her Party? The answer goes back to LPMA internal policies. As discussed in the last Chapter, Massachusetts Major Party status has odd legal implications. Major Party status does not make it easier for the party's candidates to get their names on the ballot. Nor does it change how the candidate is listed on the ballot. Major Party Status does not even grant ballot access. It is easier for a candidate to get on the ballot from a Party Designation ("minor party') than from a Major Party.
Nonetheless, in 1998 eastern Massachusetts Libertarians set their hearts on gaining Major Party Status for the state Libertarian Party. They fielded candidates for all statewide offices other than Attorney General. Howell had been the LPMA State Chair. She ran for State Auditor, sending the message 'The referee shouldn't be wearing team colors.' After receiving the endorsement of the Boston Herald—-the State's most influential newspaper—she earned 5% of the vote.
Further rumors had it that in 2000 Howell was likely to debate Kennedy. As the Party's 1996 nominee, I regularly advised that these rumors were ill-founded. The top-of-ticket Massachusetts political debates (Governor, Senator) have historically been run by the Boston media: three broadcast television stations, two newspapers, and a Cable Channel. As my 1996 U.S. Senate Campaign Staff determined by speaking to some of the media outlets, one of the other media outlets more-or-less calls all the shots. Unfortunately, that outlet is opposed to the Libertarian Party. No matter what the situation, in election after election the criteria for admission to the debate are changed to shut the Libertarian out of the debate. It was highly unlikely that Howell would ever debate Kennedy unless he personally demanded to debate her.
I should contrast the debate situation faced by Carla Howell with my own experience as a Congressional candidate in 1998. There were a dozen debates and joint appearances in the campaign. I was invited to all of them. One TV debate was given by the local station to CSPANII, which broadcast it nationally at 7PM, the Thursday before the election. Other Libertarian candidates for lower office in Massachusetts report similar experiences: When there are debates, Libertarians are usually invited to attend on the same basis as other Massachusetts candidates.
Howell's Campaign Machine
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Howell ran her campaign on the same lines as the Browne campaigns: She even retained many of the same people. She raised large amounts of money. The top end of her staff salary range was even less stingy than Browne's. She posed no significant challenge to the victorious incumbent, who got more than 70% of the vote.
Howell began her campaign in 1999. What did she do? The following is based primarily on her campaign's FEC filings and other mailings. All dollar amounts are based on campaign FEC reports, which are filed under penalty of law for false submissions. Campaigns are legally entitled to file amended reports. In preparing this Chapter, I used available data as of the date of writing. I will note points where the amended reports show interesting changes. I am also a Massachusetts Libertarian activist, not unaware of what happens in party activities in his own state. I have drawn on my own observations to fill connect of the dots.
According to its mailings, the Howell 2000 Campaign had a substantial staff. People listed on its stationery (and their reported titles) include Michael Cloud (Campaign CEO), Barbara Goushaw (Senior Advisor), Elaine Berchin (Media Coordinator), Dennis Corrigan (Projects Manager), Celeste Parent (Treasurer), Kay Pirrello (Volunteer Coordinator), Kamal Jain (Systems Manager), and Bob O'Keefe (Field Advisor). According to FEC filings, most of these people were not paid for their work. Several did receive expense reimbursements.
Campaign CEO Cloud is a long-time, well-known Libertarian fund raiser and speaker. His 1998 Nevada Senate Race, targeted primarily at Christian conservatives who would really be happy if the government would just leave them alone, almost certainly cost the Republicans a U.S. Senate Seat. Prior to 2001 the author had heard Cloud state that he maintained residence in Nevada for tax reasons. Cloud has since moved to Massachusetts, where he is regularly seen with his close friend Carla Howell, whose address he uses as his own.
In 1999 alone, Campaign CEO Cloud received $6700 from the Howell Campaign. In 2000, Cloud received nearly $76,000. Payments to the Campaign CEO were made under the cognomen "fundraising commission". At the end of 2000, the campaign committee's initial FEC reports indicated that the campaign owed Cloud an additional $47,000. The campaign's initial FEC statements thus showed that the campaign had paid and/or owed its campaign CEO very nearly $123,000 for the year 2000. To the author's knowledge this sum is the single-year record for a Libertarian campaign manager. Some of the shorter-period commission rates were even more impressive. For the period 10/1/2000-11/27/2000 the Campaign CEO was actually paid $18,000, while in the initial FEC reports at the same time the campaign increased its debt to him from $25,000 to $47,000. These payments and debts correspond to an annualized rate of $240,000 per year.
Howell's campaign has since submitted a long series of amended FEC filings. In the amended filings, the campaign's end-of-year debt to Cloud simply disappears. He is reported as being paid as amply as ever, but is no longer owed the large sums that the Campaign was unlikely to raise once the election had passed.
For 1999, the fund raising commission paid to the Campaign CEO amounted to nearly 20% of the funds raised. For 2000, actual payments of fundraising commissions exceed 10% of funds raised. If debts reported in the early FEC filings had been paid, commissions would have exceeded 17% of funds raised. The FEC reports do not indicate what formula was used to calculate the commission, whether the rate was uniform, or which funds it was paid upon. In addition to pay from the Howell Campaign Committee, Cloud received an agency fee of $2200 from the Libertarian Party of Massachusetts for the Howell ads that LPMA ran on Boston television.
The payment of "fundraising commissions" by political campaigns is a controversial topic in some circles. Writing in the May, 2001 issue of Campaigns and Elections magazine, Paul Pelletier, President of Direct Campaign Solutions, writes "No matter how you choose to receive your pay (monthly, weekly, cycle, in full) never agree to raise money on a percentage basis. Not only is this practice unprofessional, it is unethical...Faith in the fundraising profession and your own work ethic is the highest priority. A fundraiser is judged primarily on his or her ethics. Without this noble calling card, you are nothing. Avoid those who think differently." Of course, many readers of Campaigns and Elections are political consultants who have some interest in being paid flat fees rather than uncertain commissions.
The campaign paid Volunteer Coordinator Kay Pirrello $500 per week, and made a $648.61 per month 'consulting' payment to MyData Automation. The 2000 end-of-year Libertarian Party of Massachusetts ("LAMA") FEC report reports a payment of exactly this size to MyData, but identifies the $648.61 as a COBRA payment for Pirrello. On this analysis, the pay and fringe benefits for the Volunteer Coordinator came to more than $25,000.
Many of the same people and groups were active participants in both the Browne and Howell Campaigns. Michael Cloud did fundraising for both. When the Howell Campaign needed web site hosting, it rejected a request to bid from an established Libertarian-owned Massachusetts firm and turned instead to Web Commanders of Corona Hills, California. Web Commanders, which received $425 in 1999 and over $500 in 2000 for their work for Howell, reportedly has long-time Browne supporter Jack Dean as a principal. For web content, the Howell Campaign turned not to a Massachusetts resident but to Geoff Braun of Placentia, Ca., paying $250 in 1999. When in late 1999 the Howell Campaign needed telemarketing, it retained Jennifer Willis—at the same address as the Jennifer Willis who worked for the Browne campaign—paying $498 for telemarketing services.
Barbara Goushaw of Michigan, whose inspirational speech 'Guns are a Girl's Best Friend' brought Libertarians to their feet at the 1998 National Convention, was Senior Advisor to the Howell Campaign. Goushaw was listed second on the Howell Campaign letterhead, immediately under Campaign CEO Michael Cloud. Goushaw was also a vehement Browne supporter. Her most visible contribution to the Browne 2000 effort was the "Shut the F*** Up" campaign, which was a transparent attack on Browne critic Bumper Hornberger. The StFU campaign demanded that critics stop their remarks about Browne's record. According to its filings, the LPMA invited Goushaw to address its 2000 convention, and paid her a speaker's fee of $775.
The Howell Campaign raised approximately $33,300 in 1999 and $728,000 in 2000. In 1999, large contributors gave nearly $26,000 of the total, while in 2000 large contributors gave modestly over $300,000. At the end of 2000, the Campaign reported a closing cash on hand of $956.73. Between 1999 and 2000, Howell appears to have invested more than $12,000 of her own money in her campaign, while the Campaign CEO himself gave Howell's Campaign very close to the legal maximum of $2000.
The 1999 Howell fundraising total is inflated by the lawful practice of collecting General Election donations at an early date, a practice also followed by the Browne campaign. Under Federal Law, a candidate for Federal office may receive from an individual no more than $1000 for the Primary Campaign, and $1000 for the General Election campaign. However, General Election funds can be collected before the Primary Election so long as they are spent after the Primary Election. The Howell campaign recorded in 1999 donations totaling $2000 each from no fewer than 6 individuals. Many of the 1999 large contributors are recognized by the author as regular major donors to the Massachusetts state party. The effort needed to persuade these worthies to contribute to a serious campaign by the Party's outbound State Chair was not transparently large. Cloud was nonetheless paid a generous fundraising commission.
Direct mail advertising was a major component of the Howell campaign. The campaign reported using mailing firms in the Campaign CEO's home town, Las Vegas, Nevada. For 1999, more than $1000 was spent on printing and $2865 was spent on postage. In 2000, the Howell campaign spent extensively on direct mail. Nearly $35,000 went to Walter Karl Inc. of California, which handles the National Party's mailing list. Based on information supplied me by other users of the National Libertarian Party list, $35,000 would in 2000 have paid for more than eight rentals of the list of currently active members. In 2000, the campaign also spent more than $100,000 in postage and $165,000 for printing (which may include lawn signs and bumper stickers), for a grand total of slightly more than $300,000 for printing, postage, and mailing lists. This total amounts to roughly 40% of the total funds raised by the campaign, implying a return on investment on the direct mail campaign of better than 2.5:1.
Despite all these staffers and all the money raised, it is well known to Massachusetts Libertarians that the Howell campaign almost failed to place Howell on the ballot. With less than a month to go in the nearly three-month petitioning period, the campaign had reportedly collected perhaps half of the required signatures. An emergency appeal for funds and volunteers, and a maximum effort by everyone in the campaign including Howell herself, did in the end find enough signatures for Howell.
How did a ballot access crisis develop? In short, Howell needed 10,000 valid signatures to get on the ballot. Because in 2000 the Massachusetts Libertarian Party had Major Party status, registered Democrats and Republicans could not sign Howell's petition. Furthermore, the petitioning period for statewide Major Party candidates is much shorter than the petitioning period for statewide "minor party" candidates. In 2000, the author was the only Massachusetts Libertarian other than Howell to have tried running for statewide office in Massachusetts while our Party had Major Party status under the current law. I regularly warned Massachusetts Libertarians that procedures used to qualify statewide candidates in 1998—when we had much of the Summer to collect signatures, and when any registered voter could sign—would fail badly in 2000. My experience—the only relevant experience—was that signature validity rates petitions would be far lower than Howell had encountered in 1998: Validity rates would range (depending on town) from 50% down to 13%. For the 2000 ballot access drive I was not consulted by the Howell campaign.
The campaign finished with well more than the needed number of signatures, but only after an emergency petitioning effort. By report, Howell personally collected more than 1000 valid signatures in under a week. According to its emergency e-mail messages to supporters, the campaign was falling short on collecting signatures. Reportedly, it was also almost out of money, a difficulty that Browne 2000 also claimed in April. I have been told by a highly reliable source on the Party State Committee that in late April 2000 the Howell campaign came to the Libertarian Party of Massachusetts, asking for financial assistance. According to its FEC filings the LPMA gave the Howell campaign $5000 in aid. State Party support for its 2000 Senate campaign stands in stark contrast to LPMA's official policy that LPMA will not support candidates who have not yet have finished petitioning. In total, Howell's campaign and supporters spent more than $64,000 on ballot access. That's nearly $4 per valid signature actually collected.
Howell also had aid from the National Party. National support was inconsistent with their standard policy. I had run for U.S. Senate in 1996, ran into petitioning problems, and asked the National Party for help. None arrived. Indeed, after 1996 a staffer at the National office apologized to me that other members of the National Staff had hired several of my petitioners away from me. I had noted at the time that the petitioners in question had made major promises, and then disappeared without a trace, but had not known what happened to them. [Those of you who pursue my FEC reports should be advised that the petitioners I did pay have my hearty positive recommendations.] Petitioners that the National Party had declined to help find for my 1996 campaign were in 2000 found and brought into Massachusetts. In addition, National Voter Outreach (NVO) received $20,000 or so from the Libertarian National Committee for Howell petitioning. Other spending by National brought its support for Howell's campaign to more than $23,000.
In the end, Howell collected enough signatures and put herself on the September Primary ballot. As mid-Summer 2000 approached, she and her campaign entourage headed off to the Libertarian National Convention in Anaheim, California. Scenic California held its own surprises, beginning with that Spring's Libertarian primary.
California Approaching the National Convention
In several states, the Libertarian Party has Presidential Preference primaries. Under Party rules, these primaries are not binding on National Convention delegates. However, each primary gives candidates for the Presidential nomination effective ways to help local and state parties. The author saw this in 1996, when Presidential candidates Harry Browne, Rick Tompkins, and Irwin Schiff were crossing the country looking for delegates. The Massachusetts Party had a primary. We put all three men on the ballot. They appeared for the State Convention and had an hour debate, carried on New England Cable News. A debate is earned media, earned by doing something newsworthy. Earned media appearances are far more effective than are the bought media of advertising and infomercials.
In 2000, a half-dozen states potentially had primaries. The situation was substantially complicated by the difficulty that several leading candidates started very late, too late to be included in many primaries. The California primary, which was an open primary, nonetheless sent a very powerful message on the Libertarian Presidential candidates, had anyone been willing to listen. The message was a clear shot across the bow, a shot that went almost unnoticed at the time.
First, in 2000 California used an unusual open primary system. In this system, since struck down by the courts, all voters were allowed to vote in the primaries of all parties. However, for each office, you were only allowed to vote in the primary of a single party. Thus, a voter could vote in the Republican Presidential Primary, the Libertarian Senate primary, and so on down the line. However, a voter could only vote in a one primary for one office, so the same voter could not vote both for a Republican and for a Democratic for President. California has registration by Party, so your voter records identify you as a Democrat, Vegetarian, or whatever. Party ballots were marked by Party of the voter, so for the Republican Presidential Preference Primary one can determine separately how Republicans voted, how Democrats voted, and so forth.
Primary elections were binding for lower office, but a candidate could only win the primary of their own party. There were two Green Senate candidates on the ballot, either of whom could have won the primary and become the Green nominee. Every candidate was permanently associated with one and only one legal party, so there was no way to form a fusion ticket in which, e.g., the Democratic Party candidate also wins the Libertarian Primary.
Second, at the Presidential level the Bush-McCain and Gore-Bradley contests were not yet completely resolved. All four candidates were on the ballot; there was substantial public interest as to who would win each party's primary. The Libertarian Primary was also contested, candidates on the ballot including Harry Browne, L Neil Smith, Larry Hines, Dave Hollist, and Kip Lee. At the U.S. Senate level, there was a vigorous contest in the Republican Primary, with Dick Campbell, Ray Haynes, and Bill Horne running vigorous campaigns. Three other Republicans were also in the race. On the Democratic side, incumbent U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein faced token opposition from Michael Schmier. All five of these races were potentially more interesting to voters than was the Libertarian Senate Primary, in which the only candidate on the ballot was Gail Lightfoot. Lightfoot was automatically certain of winning her Party's primary and being the Party's Senate candidate.
Third, a contested primary may readily generate earned media. Candidate debates, even in one of the state's smaller political parties, can justify coverage. Indeed, there was a campaign to persuade California Libertarians that our Presidential candidates should campaign actively in the California Primary. Activist Bumper Hornberger offered to appear at the California Libertarian State Convention to alert Californians to the issue. The California Party hierarchy declined his offer, which would not have cost them travel expenses or speaker's fees. At this point, local California activists rented a room in the convention hotel, so that Hornberger could speak during a time when no convention business was scheduled.
According to Hornberger, the Browne supporters who at the time controlled the California State Party rescheduled the Saturday Convention cocktail hour to conflict with Hornberger's speech. At the start of business Saturday morning, the convention chair as first item of business asked convention delegates not to attend Hornberger's speech. It was announced that the cocktail hour would now feature door prizes, but only to people who were present at the start of the rescheduled cocktail hour. These announcements led to a prolonged debate on the convention floor. Hornberger finally spoke to an overflow capacity crowd.
Of course, it's perfectly legitimate to try to people not to listen to ideas. It may be somewhat heavyhanded as a political approach, but all transactions are open and consensual. One must ask, however, why a Presidential campaign should be so afraid of debate, publicity and campaigning.
The answer perhaps came with the primary results.
The two primaries had very different outcomes.
For the Senate races, we do not learn the party registrations of voters in each primary. Gail Lightfoot received 120,622 votes from voters of all parties. Following the vote that she herself cast for herself, the remaining 120,621 votes had no effect on the election's outcome. Running in a contested primary, the two Green candidates drew fewer than 135,000 votes, while the two candidates in the contested Reform Party primary received between them fewer than 66,000 votes.
In the Presidential Primary, results were staggeringly different. Harry Browne received only 8,852 votes from Libertarian voters. This results was well ahead of the 1,080 and 927 votes that L. N. Smith and Larry Hines received, but far less than were received by Gail Lightfoot in her uncontested primary. At 8,852 votes, Browne received substantially fewer Libertarian votes than did Republican John McCain, who received 10,165 votes from registered Libertarians.
In all, approximately 38,000 votes were cast by Libertarians. Of these, Browne received less than a quarter of the total. Browne also received 3,528 Republican votes, 3,432 independent votes, 236 Reform votes, 37 Natural Law votes, and 110 Green votes, for a total of approximately 16,000 votes. Harry Browne, with a large campaign organization, years to prepare, extensive publicity via LP News, and the name recognition of having been our party's 1996 candidate, in the end received under one-seventh of Lightfoot's vote total.
Some commentators put onto the Browne total a spin, namely that Browne lost voters to the contested Democratic and Republican primaries. It was not surprising, it was argued, that voters preferred to vote in a contested primary like Bush:McCain or Gore:Bradley, because those were open contests. At the Senate level, Libertarian voters stayed with Lightfoot. Therefore, it was not surprising that Lightfoot got far more votes than Browne.
This spin argument has several major gaps:
First, Browne himself was in an interesting contested primary. In contrast, Lightfoot's primary was uncontested. Why did Libertarian supporters bother to vote for Lightfoot, when there was no way that she could lose? Why didn't the presence of a contest help Browne, Smith, etc. collect votes?
Second, Lightfoot's Republican opponents had a vigorously contested primary, and Democrat Dianne Feinstein had a primary opponent, albeit a weak one. Lightfoot had no primary opponent at all. Lightfoot’s legal position offered voters very little. If anything, Lightfoot's Republican competition for voters was more severe than Browne's was. By the time of the California primary, it was reasonably clear that Republican challenger John McCain was struggling to keep his head above water against Republican front-runner George Bush. In contrast, the Republican Senate primary was heatedly contested.
Third, fewer than 40,000 Libertarian voters cast votes for any candidate whatsoever; only a fifth of these Libertarians voted for Browne. Lightfoot received more than 120,000 votes, three times as many votes as were cast by all Libertarian supporters of any Presidential candidate. Even if she had captured all 40,000 (-) Libertarian votes, most of her votes must have been come from supporters of other parties. In capturing more than 80,000 votes from other parties, Lightfoot labored under the stiff handicap that votes for her had no meaning, while votes for most other Democratic, Republican,...Senate candidates might possible change the name of the nominee. In contrast, Browne captured barely 10,000 votes from other parties, even though he was in a contested primary against candidates offering very different visions of the Party's future.
If Lightfoot and Browne had been equally popular among Libertarian voters and among the general electorate, the only reasonable expectation thus that Browne would have received far more votes in the Primary than Lightfoot did. In fact, Browne got far fewer votes that Lightfoot did. Lightfoot did overwhelmingly better than Browne in mobilizing non-Libertarians to her side in the primary. This difference should have been a strong message, loud and clear, about the salability of Browne as a Libertarian Presidential candidate. Browne did not draw votes. The message was not heard by the Party establishment that was supporting Browne. Instead, various Browne supporters struggled mightily to explain away the difference between the Lightfoot and Browne vote totals. The Party paid for the obfuscation in November, when Browne finished a weak fifth in the Presidential election.
The National Convention
It is the inflexible custom of national political conventions that the top-of-state-ticket candidate of the host state receives substantial time at the National Convention to make a major speech. It's a matter of courtesy. The speech is from the Party's leading candidate in the state, and reliably will be covered by the local media. The National Convention speech also solidifies the candidate's name recognition with convention delegates, many of whom are likely to be major party donors, thereby helping that candidate with fundraising.
In 2000, California as its top of ticket had a U.S. Senate election. The Libertarian candidate was Gail Lightfoot, who had done overwhelmingly better in the primary than had any Libertarian Presidential candidate. The reasonable expectation of all California Libertarians should have been that Lightfoot would be given a half-hour speech before the National convention, giving her campaign a solid publicity boost for the Fall. Lightfoot was not invited to speak to the 2000 National Convention, held in Anaheim within walking distance of Disneyland. She addressed the National Convention only because I was running for National Chair of the Party and asked her to give my seconding speech.
A substantial slot was instead allotted to a U.S. Senate candidate from far across the United States. Who was that candidate? It was Carla Howell of Massachusetts. A further speaking slot went to Howell's Campaign CEO, Michael Cloud. Instead of going to the California Senate candidate, the financial and personal benefits of being a major speaker at the National Convention went cross country to Massachusetts.
Why was Howell rather than Lightfoot given podium time? Several Libertarians who raised this question were informed that the Party only controlled the business sessions, and that the educational and informational sections in between were under the control of private contractors. There are plausible reasons for supposing that internal party politics were in fact involved in Lightfoot's exclusion.. In brief, Lightfoot was not popular with the Browne-Bergland faction in California, who had engineered her replacement as state chair by Mark Hinkle. On the other hand, Howell was the darling of the Bergland-Browne faction. This pattern was to be repeated in 2002, when Carla Howell again had a speaking slot at the National Convention in Indianapolis.
Pre-Election Spending
The Howell campaign invested substantially in advertising. Advertisements in LP News, the National Party's monthly tabloid, came to nearly $9000. Such advertisements are unlikely to influence the popular vote, but do establish the reality of the campaign with potential Libertarian donors who were receiving multiple fundraising mailings. The Howell campaign also advertised heavily in the monthly newsletter of the Massachusetts Gun Owners Action League. Full-page advertisements in the GOAL monthly magazine cost nearly $5000, but systematically reached a targeted contributor and campaign audience, namely politically active gun owners. Could this advertising approach succeed? Neither of Howell's major-party opponents had any credibility at all with gun owners, so Howell had an open field for her advertising. Constitution Party candidate Philip Lawler also advertised through the GOAL newsletter.
Direct payments to major Boston TV stations exceeded $110,000. In addition to spending by the Campaign Committee, the Libertarian Party of Massachusetts reported to the FEC spending $39,500 on Howell TV ads with WBZ-TV, Boston, for which it paid Michael Cloud an agency fee of $2200. $41,700 is a great deal for a single state Party. It was far more than the Libertarian State party gave Congressional candidate David Euchner and vastly more than it gave any of its State Legislative candidates. Fortunately, those funds were matched well by last-minute multi-thousand dollar donations to the Massachusetts Libertarian party by a series of Massachusetts Libertarians, most of whom had reached their legal limits on contributing to Howell directly.
The Howell Campaign invested heavily in motion picture theater slide advertising, which reportedly proved to be an effective way to reach young people. Payments to GRX were nearly $26,000, while other payments for advertising exceeded $58,000. Separate expenses for production costs of TV and other ads are not identifiable from the FEC reports. Nonetheless, direct spending on media advertisements by the campaign exceeded $190,000, over 25% of the campaign's total income.
Unlike the Browne 2000 campaign, which only provided bumper stickers and lawn signs to paying customers, the Howell campaign gave away its bumper stickers and lawn signs. The Massachusetts State Browne coordinator had a Browne 2000 bumper sticker because I gave him one. His requests to Browne's headquarters for lawn signs were met with explanations of what the state Browne campaign would need to pay for the materials. In contrast, supporters who wanted Howell bumper stickers and lawn signs had no trouble getting them for free.
Events at large hotels were a motif of the Howell campaign, beginning with $2087 paid in 1999 to the Westin Waltham for event rental. Events in 2000 cost slightly under $14,000. In addition to these paid events, Howell vigorously pursued public speaking opportunities, and may well have captured the 2000 U.S. Senate Campaigns All-Party record for addressing people at a political rally: The Boston Freedom Rally for marijuana re-legalization had more than 65,000 attendees when Howell addressed it.
What were the Outcomes?
Howell 2000 was the most expensive Senate campaign that our party ran in 2000, and one of the most expensive that we have ever run. In short, the campaign raised three-fourths of a million dollars, needing close to a quarter-million dollars in fundraising and related expenses to do so. An additional tenth of funds raised were transformed to a 'Fundraising Commission" for the Campaign CEO.
The Howell 2000 campaign spent more than $190,000 for advertising, close to 25% of funds raised. There is a sharp difference with the Browne campaign, both in the fraction of campaign funding actually spent on getting advertising out the door, and in the targeted media markets. Howell appears to have spent far more on running TV ads than on making them. Howell's campaign's TV ads went to primary media outlets, namely the ABC, CBS and NBC affiliates in the main media market in the Commonwealth, not to the minor cable networks used by Browne.
In the end, Howell found herself in a six-candidate race against the incumbent Democrat, Republican Jack E. Robinson, III, Constitution Party candidate Philip Lawler, Natural Law candidate Dale Friedgen, and independent candidate Philip Hyde. Republican Robinson almost failed to get on the ballot. He was totally abandoned by his own party, with many prominent Republicans publicly refusing to say for whom they would vote. Robinson was regularly ridiculed as 'Jack the Tongue' by one major Boston media outlet. Of course, no one would believe that this highly liberal publisher was playing a race card against Robinson with Republican voters.
Campaigns & Elections Magazine justifiably identified Howell 2000 as the best Senate race run by any third party in 2000. They also identified the Robinson Campaign as the worst Senate race run by either the Democrats or the Republicans in 2000. Robinson still beat Howell, 13%-12%, though Howell finished second behind Kennedy in many central Massachusetts towns