Funding Liberty! Table of Contents
Funding Liberty!
Chapter 2
Where It All Began
Browne's 1996 Campaign
Where did the chickens first hatch? To find the rookery, we need to go back in time. We need to go back a half-decade to 1994 and the first traces of the 1996 Presidential campaign. From those traces arise two interlinked themes, namely Harry Browne's 1994-1995 nominating campaign, and reactions of the LNC to Browne's overt and covert diversion of LNC staff and resources to his campaign's use.
Harry Browne joined the Libertarian Party—according to his own speeches—in the summer of 1994. Browne started at the top. He promptly launched a campaign to secure the Party's nomination for President of the United States. Browne's campaign collected its first money in mid-September.
Browne laid out the first of his many campaign plans in an interview in the October 1994 LP News. He dwelt on money and his book. Browne asserted "I can bring in new support...and new money from outside the LP—starting with the investment world. My campaign committee includes renowned investment writers like Douglas Casey...and Robert Prechter. We're already raising good sums of money from people who have never donated to the LP...my new books will reach tens of thousands of politically aware people who have never been exposed to the LP." There are recollections that Browne told the New York Junto group and the Connecticut State Convention that he could raise $50,000,000, mostly from outside the Party.
Browne's October 1994 interview also focused on his financial plans. "If I can't bring in significant amounts of the three 'M's—new media coverage, new money and LP members—I don't deserve the nomination..." and "(From October 1994 to February 1995) I want to raise $150,000. This goal is important...This money will also finance a 30-minute videotape that local parties can put on TV stations, as well as show to small groups in homes." Browne recycled the 30- minute videotape idea for his 2000 campaign. As we'll see later, it's easier to produce a 30-minute video tape than it is to get the tape onto the airwaves.
By October 1994 Browne had laid out his plan for a New Hampshire campaign. "I will run throughout 1995 and early 1996...seeking media coverage, new money, and new members. This will step up especially in September 1995 when my new book is published and when the New Hampshire primary campaign should begin."
In 1994 the Browne campaign retained the services of Kiana Delamare, paying her $24,361 during the period October-December 1994, including 9 weekly or aggregated payments of exactly $854.00 each. These weekly payments nominally correspond to a yearly salary of more than $44,000 per year. The payments were for 'consulting services, supplies, and travel'. My sources indicate that the payments in fact covered a half-year's salary, largely paid in late 1994 because in Summer 1994 the Browne campaign was short of cash. Delamare and Perry Willis were reportedly the organizers of a Browne fundraiser held simultaneously with the December 1994 National Committee meeting.
The April 1995 National Committee minutes identify Delamare as "the woman living with Perry Willis". According to Dean Ahmad's memo posted on lpus-misc in 2001, "(Willis's) girlfriend Kiana was paid by the campaign for a period that virtually coincided with her relationship with Perry." By hiring Delamare, the Browne Campaign transferred very large sums of money into the immediate proximity of Perry Willis. The alleged relationship between Delamare and Willis does not appear to have been secret. It is extremely hard to avoid the conclusion that Browne knew his payments were entering Willis's extended household.
Ahmad further noted that there was a period during which Delamare was a full-time volunteer at the National Office. During that period, according to Ahmad, Delamare also made calls on behalf of the Browne campaign. Ahmad identifies several people who received such calls, including himself.
In early 1995, the Browne campaign began its official financial relationships with the Libertarian National Committee's staff. On a series of first-quarter dates beginning on February 23, the Browne Campaign paid the LP's Director of Communications, William Winter, $388. On March 13, it paid LP National Director Perry Willis $578.
Why was Willis National Director? A convoluted path had taken him to the job. In April 1993, then-National-Director Stuart Reges, who later became Harry Browne's accountant, announced that he would resign within four months. The National Committee chose Gene Cisewski as the Party's new National Director and retained Perry Willis as interim National Director to assist in the transition. According to John Famularo's documents, Willis soon began lobbying to have Cisewski removed. Willis complained that Cisewski was not putting enough time into his work for the Party. On November 7, 1993, National Chair Steve Dasbach discharged Cisewski. According to Famularo, Dasbach had been lobbied to do so by Willis, Bill Winter, soon-to-be Browne campaign co-chair David Bergland, and Bergland's wife and soon-to-be Browne Campaign Manager Sharon Ayres. Willis was presented to the December 1993 National Committee meeting as the de facto National Director. Curiously, despite complaining that Cisewski did not put in enough time as National Director, in 1995-1996 Willis as National Director thought it was perfectly proper to invest large amounts of his own time on the Browne Campaign rather than on LNC business.
Browne's fundraising letters announced seriatim several campaign strategies. Courtesy of fellow Libertarians who collected many of them, we can track what Browne announced. The March 1995 letter was "Our plan to force Clinton to demand LP inclusion in the 1996 TV debates". Clinton, of course, never demanded anything of the kind.
On April 15, 1995 Browne spoke at the Massachusetts state convention. My eyewitness source reports that "...the New England audience was happy to hear about the New Hampshire focus and how it would help local organizations. Yes, they were all excited about the outside hard money connected to Harry."
"...he wanted to be our candidate for President and concentrate campaigning in New Hampshire as a key strategy....He would use radio appearances to sell a new libertarian book to bring in money from outside the party." Unlike past campaigns, Browne's 1996 campaign—claimed Browne—was going to be funded by sources outside the party. Not only would his book bring in outside money, it would bring in new members, again to the benefit of our state and local Party groups. Browne, my witness reports, told the Massachusetts State convention that if we nominated him he could get a record number of votes because he was a skilled salesman. In two Presidential campaigns, Browne's vote totals would set no records, even for the Libertarian Party.
April 1995: The LNC Takes Notice
The issue of interactions between the National Party's Staff and the Browne Campaign arose at the April 1995 LNC meeting, held in Phoenix, Arizona. The National Committee minutes at lp.archive.org are extensive; the next few paragraphs quote from them. Don Ernsberger, who has since quit the National Party in disgust over events such as those we are now cataloguing, began by asking National Chair Dasbach "what policy he had set up for the use of headquarters personnel and resources in relation to the presidential candidates."
The National Committee has two governing documents. Party By-Laws are passed by the delegates at National Conventions. The Policy Manual is the codification of resolutions passed by the Libertarian National Committee. Dasbach answered Ernsberger by citing "the conflict of interest provision of the LNC policy manual", which in April 1995 stated:
"D. Neither the National Director nor any other employee of the Party shall:
1. Endorse, support, contribute any money, or use his or her title or position to aid any candidate in any Party primary, or in any campaign for office, or nomination, within the Party or any State Party.
2. Serve as a delegate to any National or State Party convention.
3. Permit LPHQ to be used by anyone at any time to aid any candidate in any Party primary, or in any campaign for office, or nomination, with the Party or any State Party.
E. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that nothing in this section shall prevent the National Director or any employee of the Party from providing the same information and services that would be provided to any other member of the Party to any such candidate.
F. No Party funds may be expended in any of the types of campaigns described in this section."
According to the LNC's April 1995 Minutes, Dasbach told the National Committee "there has been some paid work...done by both Mr Willis and Mr Winter. He said that he requested that they do not do any further work until the matter could be presented to the LNC." At the April 1995 meeting, Willis told the LNC that "he has not done any work for any campaign since Mr. Dasbach has asked him not to." The October, 2001 issue of Liberty magazine provides a correction to this final statement. According to Liberty, Dasbach had recently told them that "the minutes were not completely accurate." Dasbach now asserts that in 1995 he requested "that Willis do no further work, but told Winter he could continue because the work he was doing was trivial in nature." Dasbach waited six years to make this correction.
How had it been decided that Willis and Winter's work did not violate the party rules in the Policy Manual? Willis and Winter initially decided it for themselves, apparently seeing no conflict of interest in doing so. According to the LNC Minutes: "...Mr Willis and Mr Winter reviewed the policy manual and the only thing that seemed to be at issue was the word 'support' and they determined that if the Browne campaign or the Jorgenson campaign hired an outside vendor it would not constitute support for the campaign but just a contractual relationship."
Willis and Winter's interpretation of the Policy Manual was supported by National Chair Dasbach. The April 1995 minutes note "Mr Dasbach said that it was his interpretation of the Policy Manual that if Mr Willis or Mr Winter were to provide volunteer services it would be considered support, but as long as they are being paid it does not constitute support."
Dasbach's interpretation is astonishing. The Policy Manual provided a blanket ban on 'support' with absolutely no qualification as to whether the support consisted of material goods or intangible services, whether it was donated or paid for, or whether or not it was reciprocated by the campaign. The claim that 'support' ceases to be 'support' if the supporter calls himself a vendor is extremely inventive. In any event, we know from Willis's confession that he provided ample support to Browne without being paid for it.
Dasbach was the Party's CEO. It was the National Committee's duty to speak up if it disagreed with him. The National Committee instead remained silent, not even asking how much a campaign had to pay to transform support into non-support. Commercial rates? Non-profit rates? One dollar? One red cent? The failure of the National Committee to challenge Dasbach on his claimed interpretation is disappointing, but perhaps to be expected. As critics have noted, in 1995 most members of the National Committee were vigorous Browne supporters who may have been inclined to forgive their candidate what they viewed as an apparently minor oversight.
Ignored in much, but not all, of the ensuing debate about when 'support' is 'support' were the Party By-Laws, Article I, Section 3:
"It shall be the affirmative responsibility of...each Libertarian Party (hereafter party) officer or employee to disclose to the LNC in connection with the performance of their respective duties: (a) if such person's own economic or other interests might conflict with the interests of the Party in the discharge of such duties, or (b) if such person's duty to others might conflict with the interests of the Party...Any such disclosure shall be made...prior to the discharge of such duties..."
It might very well not have been in the best interests of the Party to nominate Harry Browne. By working for the Browne campaign Willis and Winter had both gained economic interests that might conflict with the Party's interests. Willis and Winter had both perhaps gained obligations whose dutiful fulfillment might have conflicted with the Party's interests. To this day, neither Willis nor Winter has made any disclosure to the LNC about any possible conflict of interest between their work for the Party and their work for Browne's 1996 campaign.
The LNC Minutes go on to explain the Browne Campaign's original organization. "...Michael (Cloud) was asked to run Mr. Browne's campaign; (Cloud) asked the woman Mr. Willis was living with to be the primary staffer..." Willis claimed he was not initially involved in the campaign "...except as giving some advice." According to the Minutes, there had then been personnel changes in the Browne campaign. Cloud and Delamare left; Sharon Ayres took control.
Cloud is a Libertarian fundraiser. In 1991, he was liaison to the National Committee from Andre Marrou's 1992 Libertarian Presidential campaign. In 1992, his connections with the Marrou campaign were terminated. Note that Cloud changed his name; records from 1991 refer to him as "Michael Emerling". In 1994-1995 he was apparently lead staffer for the nascent Browne campaign; Sharon Ayres took over the campaign in February 1995 or so. Cloud was co-Chair of the "Project 51 in 92" PAC, which was supposed to raise large sums for ballot access petitioning, but which proved to be financially inefficient. Cloud had also by report assisted the "Project 51 in 96" PAC.
The woman was Kiana Delamare; her qualifications as a staffer are unclear. Ayres is the wife of 1984 Libertarian Presidential candidate David Bergland. Bergland was also the Party's 1976 Vice Presidential candidate, had served in the 70s as the Party's National Chair, and had repeatedly been involved in producing resolutions to disputes within the Party. He is also a well-known Libertarian author, whose works were distributed to new Party members. He became Browne's Campaign co-chair and, eventually, the 1998-2000 Party National Chair.
An obscure sentence in the April LNC Minutes provided a cover story as to the nature of Willis's winter-1995 activities for the Browne campaign. "...Mr. Willis decided to go to the next major investment conference. Sharon Ayres asked Mr Willis to write a campaign plan to be given to the people at the investment conference to try to boost their interest in ballot access." According to documents released by John Famularo, in late May Willis billed the Browne Campaign $2000 for preparing the campaign plan. Contrary to the April LNC Minutes, Willis's earlier payments reflected other activities, not the campaign plan.
Browne's Summer Campaign
Browne's May, 1995 letter was 'Our plan to get 5% of the vote in New Hampshire. $270,000 in TV ads.' Many Libertarians believed that Browne had promised to go to New Hampshire and campaign vigorously, seeking to duplicate and better Andre Marrou's 1992 triumph. In 1992, for many hours Marrou led all Democrats and Republicans by virtue of having carried the vote in Dixville Notch, a small New Hampshire town whose residents all vote at the stroke of midnight, so that until the next evening the one vote total available for the media to cover is the vote from Dixville Notch.
Within a few months, the drive to contest the New Hampshire primary was dropped. $270,000 turned out to be more than Browne spent in airing TV ads in both of his Presidential campaigns combined.
My sources with old issues of Mass Liberty, the Libertarian Association of Massachusetts newsletter, quote from 'An Interview with Harry Browne' published in the June, 1995 issue: "As far as money is concerned, I don't know how much we'll raise, but we are aiming at 50 million dollars... We have a lot of avenues available to us like the investment community that didn't exist before. We have on our campaign committee Doug Casey, Robert Prector, Mark Skousen, Adrian Day, almost all of the leading hard money investment writers who have a tremendous circulation and who will help fundraise for us and so on... And as far as organization is concerned, we have Sharon Ayres running the campaign."
For the second quarter, the Browne campaign again paid Perry Willis and Bill Winter. Willis received $2,000 on June 24 and William Winter received $885 in smaller payments spread over three months. Willis was compensated for 'consulting and reimbursement for travel', while Winter was compensated for 'consulting and reimbursement for office supplies'.
The July 1995 fundraiser went to a new topic, 'Our plan to use the CityVote to achieve national publicity'. The September 1995 fundraiser followed up on the issue, heralding 'Our plan to distribute 6 million flyers to CityVote voters.' CityVote was a non-governmentally organized primary concocted by Democratic pollsters and activists. The intent was to counter the bias in the early primaries toward small and rural states by running a non-governmental Presidential primary in urban areas. CityVote's objective was to try to look like a primary, to collect large numbers of votes, and to generate extensive publicity for the opinions of urban voters. Many of these voters were presumed by CityVote's liberal Democrat organizers to be liberal Democrats.
For Browne, CityVote was an opportunity to engage in retail politics, generate publicity for the Libertarian Party, and concentrate the campaign's limited resources on a small number of geographic areas. CityVote happened as promised, but Browne's role in the event was minimal. Browne raised money for CityVote, but does not appear to have used it effectively.
August 1995: Dasbach Defends Willis and Winter
The relationship between the Browne campaign and the National Headquarters was discussed in an exchange of emails between then-National-Chair Steve Dasbach, LNC Regional Alternate Jesse Markowitz, and long-time LP activist Dean Ahmad. In a response dated August 6, 1995 and supplied by Ahmad in a 2001 public statement, Dasbach claimed that Willis had produced a 'document' for the Browne campaign, while Winter did 'graphical layout work'.
There are three difficulties with Dasbach's claim, one relating to the National Committee, the second to the FEC filings, and the last to the actual documents from the Browne campaign. In summary: The National Committee difficulty is that the National Committee had had clear conflict of interest rules in place for more than a decade. The FEC filings difficulty is that we have Browne's FEC filings, and these reveal why Willis was actually paid. The documentation issue is that publicly available documents—if authentic—show that Willis and Winter were both heavily involved in managing the Browne Campaign.
To deal with conflict of interest, Dasbach quoted from the rules reproduced above. Dasbach admitted that Willis and Winter were providing technical support to the Browne campaign. To excuse this behavior, Dasbach observed in his memo to Markowitz that Willis produced Browne's document "...on his own time and he was paid market rate for the work." Dasbach then advanced the claim that "...Since this work neither constituted 'support' nor an in-kind 'contribution', Perry was not prohibited from performing it as a vendor." Dasbach's statement that Willis did not provide an 'in-kind "contribution" ' is a red herring, because the LNC Policy manual does not refer to in-kind contributions. The Policy Manual reference to contributions is the phrase "contribute any money".
Dasbach also claimed that Willis was paid market rates for producing "one document for the Browne campaign which dealt with issues similar to those that he provides general advice on." The nature of the document and its exact topics were never specified by Dasbach. How much was Willis paid? The 'one document' description was also used at the April 1995 LNC meeting, by which date Willis had been paid $578 by the Browne campaign. Was $578 a legitimate market rate for document preparation? Dasbach's position that $578 was the 'legitimate market rate' for preparing a document leads to interesting questions when compared with what the LNC paid Willis in 1997-1998 for document preparation..
A further difficulty with Dasbach's claim comes from the FEC filings. FEC filings require that campaigns report the "purpose of disbursement" for each expenditure. Winter's work for the campaign was characterized as "consulting", which could certainly include graphics for a series of documents. According to Dasbach in statements going back to April, Willis was compensated for preparing "one document". However, in the first quarter of 1995 Willis was paid not for "consulting" but for "travel, supplies". The question one asks is: Where did he travel and what did he do there? The other question one asks is: How is the travel compensation related to Dasbach's claim that Willis was paid for writing "a document"? It is now clear that Willis was paid for document preparation in the Second Quarter of 1995. The First Quarter payment had a different motive, one not identified correctly to the LNC by Dasbach.
Dasbach's response to Markowitz and Ahmad was extensively coached by Perry Willis, who in a July 19, 1995 memo to Dasbach discussed possible responses. In the memo as released by John Famularo, one finds Willis's particularly telling suggestion: "For that reason I think that the first step to be taken is to tell Jesse that the matter is being reviewed by the Executive Committee and that a full report will be forthcoming immediately following the July 2, EC meeting, and could he please wait until then. This would give us (the EC members) time to discuss it in private and see if we could come to a unified position." Such a unified position, of course, would be found by Willis's presumed supporters; only then would Willis's critics have any input. If Willis could obtain unified Executive Committee support for his position, a half-dozen influential voices would speak as one in defending Willis against a few critics.
From the tone of the memo, Willis clearly believed that Dasbach would support him. The memo is clearly addressed to a political ally, not to a high party official who might possibly have wondered if the Party's interests were the same as Willis's. In his memo, Willis critiqued possible reasons for saying that he should not work for Browne, notably "Because the LP owns all my productive capabilities, and doesn't wish to share them with anyone else", "My outside work conflicts with my fiduciary responsibilities", and "Because I can't do similar prospecting work for Tompkins or Schiff". No matter the reason, Willis found a justification for his conduct. Between 1995 and 2001, Willis's thinking on this topic changed little.
Willis's memo to Dasbach does not list Willis's activities for the Browne Campaign. However, members of the Campaign's core staff are listed in an 8/1/95 memo from Perry Willis, discussing the relative merits of first and third class postage. The memo as published by John Famularo is directed to Michael Cloud, Sharon Ayres, Jack Dean, and Bill Winter. Allowing that the memo is authentic:
Willis gives a careful explanation of the merit of mailing third class, as had apparently just been done, and then says "this is clearly Michael's area", "we should consult with him before making changes in his area", "We made that decision...", and refers to a "written analysis" from "Michael". The only "Michael" named in the memo is Michael Cloud.
From the text of Willis's memo, the address list is clearly the tactical leadership of the Browne Campaign. The absence of Stuart Reges confirms Reges's 2001 statement that there were things going on that he didn't know about. The presence of Ayres in the discussion should surprise no one. Jack Dean's firm was later to be the conduit of funds to Perry Willis. The statement "we made that decision" in a memo addressed to Dean implies that Dean was an active part of the Campaign's inner circle. There are two surprises on the list: Bill Winter and Perry Willis. Many Libertarians believed that Winter and Willis had helped the Browne 1996 campaign in minor ways, preparing a few documents or generating some graphics. The 8/1/95 memo shows Winter and Willis as members of the ultimate inner circle running Browne's Campaign.
In discussions before the National Committee, Steve Dasbach claimed that Willis had simply prepared some documents at market rates. From the Invoice and Dasbach's confession, we know that statement was partly true. Willis had written fundraising letters for Browne. The 8/1/95 memo shows that Dasbach's statement was incomplete. From the memo, Willis was in fact one of perhaps five principals running Browne's campaign. Willis discusses which postage was used for a mailing, saying unambiguously "we made that decision".
The belief that Willis remained substantially active with the Browne Campaign appears to be corroborated by a 1995 Calendar, alleged to be for Perry Willis and released by John Famularo, showing Willis's Work and Evening schedules for June 14—ca. June 30, 1995 (with fragmentary futureward entries). The list gives a wide variety of tasks performed by Willis for the Browne campaign as part of his "Work" schedule, i.e., his schedule of work done during the day on what ought to have been the LNC's time. The Perry Willis who had lobbied against National Director Cisewski for not working hard enough for the LNC spent part of his own day hours working for Browne.
In discussions before the National Committee, Steve Dasbach asserted that Winter simply did graphics design. From the 8/1/95 memo, Dasbach's claim about Winter and Willis were apparently equally incorrect. The memo—if authentic—shows that Bill Winter actively participated in running the Browne Campaign. Unlike Willis, Winter remained until late 2002 on the LNC payroll, editing the National Newsletter, LP News.
On 8/1/95, all across America, hundreds of supporters of Ohmen, Tompkins, and Schiff could have contemplated the dues they had paid and the donations they had given to the National Party--dues and donations they had voluntarily given to support the Libertarian movement as a whole. One can only wonder: What they would have thought if they had learned that their money had instead supported the Presidential campaign of Harry Browne, by paying two of his apparent principal operatives?
Finally, keep your eye on the above list of names. It may be a half-decade later, and a few of the people are less visible, but many of the same people are still active in the Party. As shall be seen in the final chapters of this book, some of them are hard at work trying to create a 2004 Presidential campaign that will be the same old, same old, a clone in every key aspect of the 1996 and 2000 Presidential campaigns.
In the third quarter of 1995 Willis was not paid at all by the Browne campaign. No debt to Willis was reported by the Browne campaign, so Willis's fourth-quarter 1995 payment must refer to acts performed during the fourth quarter. What did Willis do in late 1995? Why did the Campaign compensate him for travel? I recall an anecdote supplied me by Lorenzo Gaztanaga, LNC At-Large member for 2000-2002. Gaztanaga had attended a Maryland Party meeting in the early-mid 90's. Willis appeared, and had been expected by Gaztanaga to speak on one of the party's outstanding issues for the period. Gaztanaga recalled being deeply surprised when Willis instead spent much of his time at the podium extolling the virtues of Harry Browne as a Presidential candidate. That is indeed travel by Willis beneficial to the Browne campaign, for which Willis might have been compensated, but it is not document preparation. If Gaztanaga's memories are accurate, and he recalls the events very clearly because he was struck by the incongruity in Willis's remarks, Willis was able to speak because he was National Director. Willis's use of the podium to extoll Browne was therefore effectively a use of his Party Office to endorse a candidate, yet another violation of National Committee Rules.
Willis also performed other tasks for the Browne campaign. The Browne campaign had a fundraiser in parallel with the December 1994 LNC meeting. According to Dean Ahmad's June 2001 memo, "...Perry set up the Harry Browne event that coincided with the LNC meeting, a fact which even confused the hotel staff, which put a 'Harry Browne' sign up at the LNC conference room." It appears that no member of the National Committee was curious as to why the Hotel confused the LNC staff that arranged the LNC space with the Browne staff that arranged the Browne space.
In his letter to Ahmad and Markowitz in August 1995, Dasbach asserted that Browne's fundraisers '...have all been written by Michael Emerling [Cloud], with extensive input from Mr. Browne. It was not a secret that Cloud was writing letters for Browne. Dasbach claimed that Browne made extensive inputs into Emerling's letters for Browne. How could Dasbach know this if he had remained aloof from Browne's campaign? Mark Tuniewicz as quoted later noted that Dasbach appeared to have had a remarkable store of inside information on the Browne Campaign.
If Browne were editing his letters vigorously, it would be very difficult for Browne not to have known who was writing them. The reader may decide for himself whether it is even marginally credible that in a campaign as small as Browne's, on an issue as critical as fundraising, that Browne would not have reviewed all aspects of fundraising letters, including approving the proposed authors before they began writing. Indeed, John Famularo has released the text of a Browne fundraising letter being vigorously edited, with comments from the editor to Perry (Willis) and Terry (Bronson). It is extremely hard to read the document without concluding that the editor speaking to Perry was Harry Browne.
Willis did not always travel to meet with Browne. In his June 2001 memo, Dean Ahmad reported "Some months before the HQ (Libertarian Party National Headquarters) move to the Watergate [GP: occurred in July 1995], Jesse Markowitz dropped by the national office and, asking to see Perry, was told that Perry was 'in a meeting' and could not be disturbed. Jesse had no urgent business, so he lingered doing some volunteer work. After about an hour Perry emerged from his office with Harry Browne."
Markowitz's observations suggest further violations of National Committee Policy by Willis and the Browne campaign. The LNC Policy manual forbade employees to "Permit LPHQ to be used by anyone at any time to aid any candidate in ...any campaign for ... nomination...". Here, however, is the National Director using Party Headquarters to hold a prolonged private meeting with a candidate for the Party's Presidential nomination. When this issue was raised by Ahmad and Markowitz with Dasbach, Dasbach claimed "Perry gave Harry Browne a tour of LPHQ when he was in Washington. There were no meetings and no campaign business discussed." We do not know what was discussed, but by eyewitness account Willis and Browne had a prolonged private meeting in Party Headquarters, not just the guided tour claimed by Dasbach. There are also multiple reports of Browne literature being stored in the National Party HQ, contrary to LNC Policy.
Finally, according to Ahmad's memo, Dasbach informed Ahmad and Dean that the Browne campaign bought its uses of the mailing list "Directly from the LP Office. This is standard procedure for all internal rentals, including all rentals by prospective candidates." The significance of this statement will be clarified when we examine Browne's 1996 FEC reports, how Browne spent his money, and how the LNC gave Browne's nominating campaign direct financial assistance in January-June 1996.
Browne's Fall Campaign
For the third quarter, FEC reports show that William Winter was paid $1142, again for consulting and reimbursement for office supplies, in three not-quite-uniform monthly payments. Willis was not paid by Browne in the third quarter. For the fourth quarter, FEC filings show that Bill Winter was paid $688 for "consulting and reimbursement for office supplies". On November 7, 1995, Perry Willis was paid $465 for "consulting and reimbursement for travel".
By Fall 1995, the campaign plan took on a very different tack. Browne's October 1995 letter was 'Our Plan to get Harry Browne's book on the New York Times best seller list.' The plan was simple. Every LP member was asked to buy a copy of Harry's book 'Why Government Doesn't Work', which put Browne's name on the cover as author. True believers would buy two, three, many copies of Harry's book. All those sales would put Browne's book on the best-seller list, making it more likely that non-Libertarians would buy it. The author vividly remembers seeing appeals to loyal Libertarians to purchase many copies of 'Why Government Doesn't Work', enough to give the illusion that the book was extremely popular. In the end the market manipulation scheme failed.
Many Party members began to wonder if Browne was running for President, or using the Party to promote his books. Like the other plans in Browne's fundraising letters, the 'best-seller' scheme failed to transit from the world of ideas to the world of events. The New Hampshire campaign? The outside members? Vast support from the financial community? The support for local chapters? CityVote? Those ideas had sunk without a trace.
Unsurprisingly, many New Hampshire Libertarians who had been generous to the Browne campaign felt that they had been swindled. They had given generously to support an LP Presidential campaign in their home state, and the campaign wasn't going to show up. Come 2000, when Browne again ran for President, his organization had to appoint Richard Watras, Jr. of Massachusetts to run his New Hampshire volunteer drive, because no New Hampshirite would agree to serve.
December 1995: The LNC Acts
The December National Committee Meeting resumed its consideration of conflict of interest issues. LNC Treasurer Hugh Butler proposed a resolution:
"Whereas, the LNC is aware that LP headquarters employees have accepted outside consulting work, and, in as much as the LNC deplores conflicts of interest within the Party,
Therefore be it resolved that consulting work carried on by headquarters staff members are authorized by the LNC so long as:
1. Both the work and income amounts are disclosed to the Chair.
2. Employees agree to terminate specific work when requested by the Chair.
3. The National Director is not authorized by this motion to accept outside work.
4. The Chair and the National Director shall report all such activities to the LNC."
There was the pointed debate. Willis spoke against the motion. At first, Willis claimed that he could determine himself whether "...a specific request from Sharon Ayres for the Browne campaign would or would not violate his fiduciary responsibility to the party." He then threatened to resign if he were not permitted to do outside work. He claimed to have "outside clients" who he would not abandon. LNC Region 6 Representative Joseph Brennan observed "there could be a perception of conflict among those members who are supporting candidates other than Harry Browne." Willis then announced that he would ignore the Party's current policy, saying that "...Sharon Ayres is his friend and (he) would give her advice if asked but that does not constitute conflict of interest." That is, at the December 1995 LNC Meeting, Willis told the LNC that regardless of LNC Policy he would continue to support the Browne Campaign if the Campaign asked him to. It appears that LNC members did not recognize where Willis's position might lead.
Dasbach repeated his claim that the present rules meant: "...the current policy is that staffers can not do work for internal campaigns for free but can do so if paid." The validity of Dasbach's interpretation of the Policy Manual was not challenged. We now know that Willis violated even Dasbach's interpretation of LNC policy.
Butler was then allowed to amend his own motion, the conditions on an employee for accepting consulting work being changed to:
"1. Both the amount of work and the income from it shall be approved by the Chair,
2. Employees agree to terminate improper work when requested by the Chair.
3. The Chair will report the facts to the LNC."
The amended motion passed.
The National Director was now allowed to take outside work, so long as the amount of work and the income from it were approved by the National Chair. Reporting 'the facts' to the LNC was specifically charged only to the Chair, no longer to the Chair and the National Director. The 'facts' to be reported were not identified.
This change in the consulting rules had significant implications for all members of the headquarters staff. Consulting arrangements by staffers were now indisputably facts which were material to the LNC's conduct of its affairs. Every staffer now had a Federal legal obligation to disclose to the National Chair any such arrangements of which he became aware, particularly if there were good reasons for the staffer to suppose that the consultant had failed to disclose the arrangements himself.
There are certain anomalies in how Willis and others interpreted Butler's original motion and in how Butler revised the motion. The original motion says that Willis is not authorized by this motion to do outside consulting. However, Dasbach had been saying for months that Willis already had authorization to do work for internal campaigns for pay. Dasbach was the Party's CEO. His interpretation of the National Committee's rules may have been unreasonable, but the National Committee as the Party's governing board did not dispute it when the opportunity arose. Because Willis already had—in the absence of LNC correction of Dasbach's interpretation—authorization from the CEO, Willis did not need further authorization to work for Browne. Perry Willis's pre-December work for Browne thus did not violate Party rules as they were then understood.
Willis apparently interpreted Butler's motion in its original form as withdrawing permission for him to consult. Butler's words do not say this. In the context of the meeting, perhaps this is what the original motion was understood to mean. Butler was National Treasurer in early 1996 when LNC, Inc. gave Browne direct financial support. From the record Butler, as Chief Financial Officer, failed to advise the National Committee that it was supporting Browne financially. Did Butler know? An ardent Browne supporter might have kept silent about the support. An ardent Browne supporter making an apparent conflict of interest motion might also have phrased it so that it authorized Willis to continue, while leaving inattentive Committee members with the misapprehension that they had suspended Willis's permission to consult.
In its revised form, Butler's motion allowed Willis to work for Browne, so long as the specified disclosures were made and Dasbach approved. Curiously, Willis's apology and other sources refer to the new rules as forbidding Willis to work for outsiders, even though Butler's original motion had been modified at Willis's request to make clear that Willis was permitted to do this work. How could Willis have overlooked the change in the content of the motion?
At this point, an interesting question arises. Which rule did Willis actually break with the Invoice? Contrary to his statement in his apology that under the new rules he was not allowed to take consulting work, under the rules Willis was allowed to take Browne's money. He was simply required to disclose the work to the National Chair and receive the National Chair's approval. If Willis did not tell Dasbach, Willis had violated a National Committee rule, but not the rule he said he had violated. Hypothetically, if Willis had informed Dasbach and received his approval, and Dasbach had neglected to inform the National Committee of 'the facts', Dasbach rather than Willis would have been in violation of the Policy Manual.
This is not to say that Willis did not break Party rules. The Conflict of Interest rule required a disclosure from Willis and Winter that was never made. There is eyewitness testimony (from Jesse Markowitz) and documentary evidence (Willis's June calendar) that Willis used the National Headquarters facility for Browne's campaign. It was not until 1996 that Browne's supporters within the LNC and its staff diverted Party funds to the Browne campaign.
Ominously, the National Committee had failed to face up to Willis's announcement that he would continue to advise Sharon Ayres without being paid. That advice, if more detailed than the advice Willis would give every other Presidential candidate if asked, constituted support by Willis for the Browne campaign. Even under the very narrow interpretation of the Party's Policy Manual being advocated by National Chair Dasbach, Willis as National Director was forbidden to support the Browne campaign for free. Without minuted objection, the National Committee swallowed Willis's announcement that he would break Party Rules. When the National Committee allowed Willis's announcement to stand, the National Committee lost control of the Party.
Willis's position that he could ignore rules he disliked would come back in five years to haunt the National Committee.