Funding Liberty! Table of Contents
Funding Liberty!
Chapter 1
The Chicken Comes Home to Roost
And here is where we begin:
April 21, 2001. The Libertarian Party's National Committee meets. In late afternoon, close to 4 P. M., former Party National Secretary John Famularo circulates around the hall, personally handing out copies of a memorandum to members of the National Committee.
Famularo's memorandum read:
"To: LNC Members and Alternates
From: John D. Famularo
Date: 21 April 2001
Subject: Proposed Contract with American Liberty Foundation, Inc., et al.
Since the LNC is currently contemplating entering into a joint venture with American Liberty Foundation, Inc., Real Campaign Reform, Inc., and U.S. Justice Foundation, Inc., and since Perry Willis and Jack Dean are principals in at least two of these organizations, and since the LNC may be depending on the veracity of statements from these individuals and may be assuming that these individuals and others involved in this joint venture have the same basic motivation for participation as the LNC and Libertarian Party, I believe that the following information is germane at this time.
Mr. Willis, the National Director at the time, assured the LNC in early 1995 that any paid work for the Browne campaign had ceased. There is evidence that Mr. Willis continued to work for the Browne campaign throughout the balance of 1995 and into 1996 prior to the July 1996 nominating convention, through a mechanism of billing Jack Dean's company, Dean & Spear for work done by Willis for the Browne campaign. This type of transaction would not appear on either Browne's or the LNC's FEC reports. Attached is a copy of an invoice from Perry Willis to Jack Dean referencing a contract for payments for Willis for work done for the Browne campaign. There is other evidence available.
It is worthy of note that the hiring of Mr. Dean and his company as contractors to the LNC was done at the urging of Mr. Willis during his term as National Director.
See Attached."
The attachment was an invoice.
An invoice dated February 28, 1996, 12:11 PM, to Dean, Spear & Associates of Fullerton, California. An invoice from Perry Willis of Arlington, Virginia, identified as "Billing for February, 1996, Browne for President contract"
An invoice for $2000, itemized as:
1. December Letter $500
2. January Letter $500
3. February Letter $500
4. First Prospecting Letter $500
Total: $2,000
The Invoice given to the National Committee was a printed copy of a computer .pdf file. .pdf is a specific computer format for generating high-quality printed documents. To my knowledge, Famularo had in his possession an unsigned electronic file. If there was ever a paper document bearing signatures, I have yet to find a witness who saw it.
My friends on and near the Libertarian National Committee report that the LNC's response was quite muted. There was no discussion of the documents during the LNC meeting. Famularo reports that no one asked him afterward about the Invoice or his cover memo. In particular, according to Famularo no one on the LNC asked about the 'additional evidence'. Perhaps some LNC members had not had time to read the memo. Some later said that in the rush of the meeting they did not notice receiving it. Perhaps LNC members needed time, more than the few moments before the resumption of their April 21 meeting, to recognize what they had been given or to compare the Invoice with their memories of the LNC's rules.
Famularo tells me that on the morning of the meeting he spoke separately with three high LNC officials, namely National Chair Jim Lark, National Vice Chair Dan Fylstra, and 2001 National Director Steve Dasbach. He described the memo's contents. According to Famularo, one of them didn't immediately see the issues that the memo raised, a second wanted to hear nothing unfavorable to Browne, and the third said nothing.
The LNC may not have responded immediately to Famularo's revelations because his cover letter needed to connect a few more dots. The memo notes that Willis had said that in early 1995 he had stopped working for the Browne campaign for pay, that there was evidence that Willis had continued to work during early 1996 for the Browne campaign for pay, and that the attached invoice shows a billing path to Willis. However, the memo neglected to remind readers that the attached invoice not only shows the billing path but the dates for Willis's work, these dates being within the period in which Willis was supposedly not working for the Browne campaign, and therefore the invoice was direct evidence that 'Willis continued to work for the Browne campaign...into 1996'.
The cover memo also did not remind readers as to why the discrepancy was of interest. Since 1982, the LNC's employment policies had forbidden the National Director to do secret work for a person seeking the Party's Presidential nomination. The Invoice implies that there were major breaches of LNC rules by Harry Browne's 1996 Presidential Campaign Committee.
Here matters stood for three weeks. Were wheels were turning behind the scenes? To the alert Libertarian public, nothing appeared to happen. My sources say that the National Committee members did not discuss the memo on their closed email lists. Most Libertarians, even most Libertarians who are electronic mailing list readers, apparently never examined the Invoice, because it was being circulated in an electronic format that was not in that time frame generally accessible.
Dramatis Personae
Who are the people and groups I mentioned above?
The LNC is Libertarian National Committee, Inc., elected governing body of the Libertarian Party of the United States. The LNC consists of four National Officers (Chair, Vice Chair, Secretary, Treasurer), five At-Large Representatives, and nine Regional Representatives (each of whom has an Alternate Representative).
John Famularo is a long-time Pennsylvania activist and outstanding critic of a clique widely seen as having excessive influence over the Libertarian Party. On the date shown in the Invoice, Perry Willis was the Libertarian Party's National Director, the Party's highest-ranking paid employee.
Jack Dean is the Dean of Dean, Spear & Associates, a political consulting group, and principal of Web Commanders, an Internet firm oft-associated with Libertarian campaigns and groups, including the Libertarian National Committee. Harry Browne was the Party's 1996 and 2000 Presidential candidate. FEC (Federal Election Commission) filings for late 1995 and early 1996 show Dean, Spear & Associates received an average of $1000 a month from Harry Browne's Presidential Campaign Committee for "consulting" and other activities.
American Liberty Foundation, Inc. and Real Campaign Reform, Inc. are organizations apparently formed by Harry Browne or his associates around the time of the 2000 Presidential campaign. U.S. Justice Foundation, Inc, is a tax-exempt conservative 501c(3)organization. The proposed joint venture with the LNC involved fundraising for litigation not then filed against Federal laws regulating campaign and political finance.
A Surprise Confession
Three weeks after the Invoice was disclosed to the LNC, Perry Willis published a response to Famularo's revelation.
Most Americans know how politicians usually behave when they are caught doing something wrong. If the evidence is weak, there is often a denial of guilt. These denials lead to embarrassment when initially weak evidence is followed by more convincing supporting testimony. If the evidence is strong, a conventional response is based on confession, contrition, and an appeal for absolution. The confession is typically accompanied by statements that the politician misunderstood the rules, made an innocent error, should have listened more carefully to his advisors (unless the advisors get the blame)... . In any event, the action hurt no one and had no significant consequences. There follows the obligatory ritual admission that the politician made a mistake, regrets having hurt people, and is taking responsibility for what was done—a phrase that does not imply that the politician will do anything to correct the error. The phrase 'take responsibility' worked for Janet Reno after the Branch Davidian Holocaust at Waco, Texas.
Following the apology to the public, there is sometimes a ritual promise that the politician has learned from his mistake and will never again stray from the path of the honest and the righteous. If you watched President Clinton deal with the Lewinsky issue, you saw all the major steps.
For readers who understood the implications of the Invoice and expected a conventional response, Willis's remarks must have been astounding. From beginning to end, Willis ignored political orthodoxy.
Willis's response was downloadable as a .pdf file from the Harry Browne site at www.harrybrowne.org/policy, and is also available in html form at http://www.lp2000.com/BCI/PWconfess.htm. The response goes on for 20 full pages, close to 10,000 words. Buried within a paragraph on page 13 is a seeming admission that the Invoice is authentic: Willis says that the Invoice could have been obtained from Willis's hard drive on an unspecified computer. Famularo's recent statements indicate that the Invoice was in fact found on Famularo's computer.
Willis did admit that the substance of the Invoice is genuine: He had taken money for performing the described acts. In admitting that he took the money, Willis says (his memo, page 11) "I received exactly one payment before the current policy was put into place, and (if I recall correctly) exactly one payment after." The reader is left by Willis to wonder if Willis's recollections are correct, or if afterwards he took other payments. The Browne Campaign filed financial disclosure statements with the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Browne's FEC filings show that Willis took three payments from Browne, not one, before the current policy went over effect.
Willis's confession makes clear his understanding of the situation. Willis knew at the time that what he was doing was wrong. In early 1996, Willis was the Libertarian Party's National Director. Long-standing Party rules forbade him to work behind the scenes and assist candidates still seeking the Party's nomination. "...I had to disobey an LNC Policy," he admits on page one, sentence two. Later on the same page, Willis again admits that he believed at the time that he was violating Party National Committee (LNC) rules: "As of late 1995,...Bill (Winter) and I were employed by the LNC and a new policy prohibited us from assisting nomination campaigns." The policy in question actually dates to the early 1980s. We'll discuss the recent policy below.
Willis goes on at great length to explain why he did what he did. In essence, Willis supported the Presidential campaign of Harry Browne, an investment advisor who in 1996 had recently joined the Party. Browne had spent many years condemning political activity. Indeed, there are reports that for many years he had not voted. Now Browne suddenly wanted to run for President of the United States.
Under several LNC conflict of interest rules, Willis understood that he could not secretly help Browne. As National Director, Willis was required by his employer, the Libertarian National Committee, to remain neutral in word and deed with respect to nominating campaigns. After all, the membership dues of supporters of every candidate were paying Willis's salary. Following the National convention, the National Director had to be able to work with the Presidential campaign of the Party's nominee, no matter who that nominee was. A National Director who had not been neutral would create impossible tensions within the Party.
Given that Willis supported Browne, while Party rules demanded his neutrality, what was Willis to do? In his memo (page 2), Willis claims that he had three choices: (1) Resign as National Director and help Browne. (2) Persuade the LNC to change its rules. (3) Stay on as National Director and disobey National Committee rules. Willis did not list a choice (4): Stay on as National Director and obey Party rules.
Willis claims the first alternative would have disrupted party activities. A case could be made that Willis had an extremely elevated sense of his own importance to the Party's ability to function. The second alternative would have taken months, longer than the Browne campaign could afford. Choice 4 does not appear to have entered Willis's thoughts, though many Libertarians would say that, once Willis had decided to stay on as National Director, (4) was his only moral choice. Willis instead chose to stay on as National Director, but to ignore Party rules that kept him from aiding Browne.
Willis is imprecise as to whether or not Browne's money influenced his decision to break the Libertarian Party's rules. He claims on page 11 of his memo "Most of what I did for the Browne campaign I did for free. When I first decided to disobey the policy I figured 'If I'm going to disobey the policy I might as well get something out of it.' " Willis was already on the Party payroll and was paid well for the job that he was supposed to be doing. There is evidence that he also had LNC employees under his direction do work for the Browne campaign. There is documentary evidence that before the 1996 nominating convention the LNC, with Willis's knowledge, gave Browne's campaign substantial financial support, even though other Libertarians were competing for the nomination.
Willis continues: "I received exactly one payment before the current policy [GP: forbidding him to aid secretly pre-nomination campaigns] was put into effect, and (if I recall correctly) one payment afterwards. The Browne campaign was having trouble catching up on past debts, so I stopped charging, but I kept doing the work..."
There is data suggesting that Willis does not recall correctly. Extensive documentary evidence shows tens of thousands of dollars being channeled to Willis's immediate vicinity by the campaign. Browne’s FEC statements show additional payments.
The Libertarian Party unintentionally gave Willis a large financial incentive to break Party rules and help Browne. Willis emphasizes that his employment agreement with the Party included performance bonuses based on Party membership and income. Browne's campaign claimed that it was working to increase Party membership and income. Willis knew that if Browne's campaign succeeded, Willis would personally benefit financially from a substantial increase in his salary and eventually in his severance pay. In contrast, if Willis had worked for a candidate whose objectives involved building stronger local organizations and electing Libertarians to office, national Party membership and income might have grown less rapidly, in which case Willis might have suffered financially.
Based on the available evidence, Willis wrote the four letters enumerated above and was paid for them. Willis says (above) that he 'kept doing the work' and that 'Most of what I did for the Browne campaign I did for free.'. What work did he do for free? The work was not the letters; he was paid for those. Recent documentation publicly released by John Famularo provides a partial answer. Careful examination of the Party's FEC reports sheds additional light.
Willis admits that he hid the payments from the Party, and prevaricated about having taken them. He writes on page 13 of his Memo:
"Some people have hurt feelings because I concealed my actions from them or I lied to them. I understand. I sympathize. I feel badly about that. But this only goes so far.
"If I had informed people of what I was doing, they would have had to stop me and thereby stop the benefits to the party. Or they would have had to hide what they knew..."
I have omitted most of Willis's self-serving justifications for what he did. In short, Willis claims he believed it was good for the Party to nominate Browne. Willis claims he believed that Browne was running a superior sort of campaign, a campaign that would be better for the Party than the campaigns of Browne's opponents. Willis then claims that since he personally knew what was best for the Libertarian Party, he was entitled to ignore the Party's rules, turn his back on the Party that employed him, and do instead what he personally thought best.
In essence, according to his confession, Willis viewed himself as a superior sort of person, entitled to ignore the petty rules that bound the inferior sorts of people who supported Browne's inferior competitors for the Presidential nomination: Ohmen, Tompkins, and Schiff. Because Willis viewed himself as a superior sort of person, he was entitled to deceive the thousands of Libertarians who paid their dues, elected National Convention delegates, and erroneously believed that they were the owners of a democratically run Party based on honest elections under agreed-upon rules for Party officers and national candidates. Willis finally urged that since he broke Party rules in the past, we should change Party rules to permit future National Directors to do what he did.
If you were looking for statements of contrition or appeals for forgiveness, you will need to look elsewhere.
Browne's Illicit Payment Procured Him the Nomination
In the usual script for a political confession, the politician doing the confessing says that while he did break the rules, his actions really didn't matter: If he had obeyed the rules the same outcomes would have come to pass. In the current context, if Willis were following the usual script he would be expected to say that while he broke the rules, Browne would have been nominated in 1996 anyway, so what he did for Browne was unimportant.
Willis actually says exactly the opposite. Unfortunately, Willis has an extensive record of making false statements, beginning with earlier claims that he was not taking secret payments from Harry Browne's campaign. What did Willis claim, and should it be believed?
Quoting again from his May 11 memo, page 2:
"As of late 1995, the LP had only three direct-mail writers with proven track records: Michael Cloud, Bill Winter, and Perry Willis. Bill and I were employed by the LNC and a new policy prohibited us from assisting nomination campaigns.
"Michael Cloud was doing the Browne campaign's fund-raising letters, but for reasons having nothing to do with Michael's talent (in many ways he's better than I am), the letters weren't coming out on time and they weren't pulling very well when they did.
"The Browne Campaign was doing aggressive, public outreach...It was also running deep into debt and was in danger of having to curtail its outreach activities. This would have had negative consequences for future fundraising that could have led the campaign to suspend operations entirely."
and further down the page "This situation was critical. If the Browne campaign had to curtail or suspend its outreach, the party would go from one outreach-oriented campaign to none."
Willis later examines the consequences of his actions. On page 3 of his memo:
"Would the Party be better off today if I had obeyed the policy?
"Even with my help the Browne campaign struggled to make it to election day. Without my help I don't think they would have made it through the winter of 1995-96. Had I not disobeyed the so-called "conflict-of-interest" [GP: Willis's quotation marks] policy(:)
"* The campaign's outreach efforts would have stopped..."
Finally, on page 5 Willis says "There's no question that if the Browne campaign had done less to benefit the party, fewer convention delegates might have voted for Harry. And if Harry's campaign had shut down because it couldn't generate fund-raising letters, one of the other candidates would have won by default." But Willis has already said that only he could have generated those letters, without which Browne would have lost, so here Willis unambiguously claims that without his actions, another candidate would have won the 1996 Libertarian Presidential nomination.
Are Willis's claims credible? Did he save the Browne campaign? Or is his memo a puff piece for his greatness, a bit of blustering bravado from the ego of a political operative caught with both hands in the cookie jar? Was Willis a good purchase for Browne, or did Browne waste the tens of thousands of dollars that his campaign appears to have funneled to Willis's vicinity?
There are reasons to suppose that in late 1995 the Browne campaign was in a state of fiscal exigency, for good reason. Some readers will recall that Browne's 1995 campaign strategy was pointed at the New Hampshire primary. As 1996 approached, Browne suddenly cancelled his New Hampshire plans. Browne kept the money he had raised for his New Hampshire campaign, but announced that he would not campaign in New Hampshire. All across America, checkbooks of offended donors slammed shut. Willis himself says Browne's further fundraising letters "... weren't pulling very well..."
Is Willis's judgement on Presidential campaigns sound? Would Browne's campaign really have collapsed? We will later consider the financial data released by Browne's 1996 campaign, and what the data reveal. The internal evidence supports Willis's claims. In late 1995 Browne's campaign was in serious financial straits. Willis's judgement is based on sound practical experience. He managed Browne's 2000 Presidential campaign, from 1997 through supposed fiscal crises in 2000 and on to November. His 2001 letter on his 1995-1996 activities is informed by his experience running Browne's second campaign. Furthermore, as of this writing no one from Browne's 1996 campaign has been heard to contradict Willis's claims about the importance of his letters.
Finally, it was certainly not in Willis's best interests, or the best interests of the people he served, to make his claims if they were false. It would have been much better for the reputations of Willis, Browne, and Browne's 1996 Campaign team if Willis had said that his letters didn't matter, and that the letters had had no real effect on the nomination. If Willis had said the letters didn't matter, he, Browne, and company could have agreed that although Willis should not have taken the money or done the work, the payment was de minimis: The money didn't change much of anything.
There is a simple argument indicating that Willis is telling the truth. The argument is not totally reliable, because different people have different estimates as to where their best interests lie: Nonetheless, when someone in Willis's position makes a confession that seriously harms his position and reputation, it is very plausible that the confession is true. If it were not true it would never have been made, except perhaps to cover up an even worse truth. Willis's record for honesty is not untarnished, but if he were going to tell a lie, one would have expected that he would not tell a lie that made him look worse than he really was, unless there was an even worse truth that needed disguise. The internal evidence thus strongly indicates that Willis's specific claims about his deeds and their consequences are true.
Browne Knew and Approved of His Campaign's Actions
What did the candidate know about the deeds of his campaign? Harry Browne would not have been the first candidate to discover that his campaign staff had done something unfortunate. In an email dated May 13, 2001, Harry Browne addressed Perry Willis, the Libertarian Party's Executive Committee (Chair Jim Lark, Vice Chair Dan Fylstra, Treasurer Deryl Martin, and National Committee members Dehn, Bisson, and Gilson, but curiously omitting National Secretary Steve Givot), most other members of the Party National Committee, and five senior members of the Party's Washington Staff: Steve Dasbach, Bill Winter, Ron Crickenberger, George Getz, and Nick Dunbar. Browne wrote:
"A lot of people are quite distressed over Perry's message. I understand that. I don't expect the distress to be abated in the near future. However, I would like to make one suggestion, if I may.
"It would be well for people to wait before speaking in order to give as much thought to their reactions as Perry gave to his statement before he released it. Shooting from the hip merely puts you in a position of later having to stand by statements and positions that you may come to realize you may not have thought through. Perry spent several days on his statement. I went over it with him. I think it might be prudent for you, too, to think over the consequences of your statements before releasing them.
"I will issue a statement in a few days, after emotions have relaxed a little. Just as I've suggested for you, _I_ want to be sure that I don't say anything too quickly that I might regret.
"With best wishes,
"Harry"
Browne's remarks are interesting for several reasons. Browne, speaking of Willis and Willis's statement, writes "I went over it with him." This is the point at which an honest man, surprised to learn that his staff had done something that he wishes they hadn't, might reasonably have added a few words in sadness. They could be phrased positively, e.g. 'I knew it was important to help my friend Perry with his statement, even though I was disappointed by some of the things I learned that he had done, all with the best of intentions.' Browne said nothing of the kind.
Browne also said "wait before speaking in order to give as much thought to [your] reactions as Perry gave to his statement before he released it." Browne went over Willis's statement with Willis before it was released, so he knew whereof he spoke. Browne testifies that Willis's remarks cannot be construed as an emotional outburst, but are a calculated response to the situation.
Did Browne know in 1996, or did his email adhere to the letter of his suggestion 'don't say anything too quickly that I might regret' by carefully saying nothing? Browne promised to release a statement of his own. As of this writing, he has yet to do so.
What did Browne know in 1996? All doubt was soon to be removed.
On Wednesday, May 23, the Executive Committee of the Libertarian National Committee (James Lark, Dan Fylstra, Steve Givot, Deryl Martin, Joe Dehn, and Ken Bisson, with Michael Gilson de Lemos absent for medical reasons) had an extended telephone meeting to discuss the situation.
The events of that meeting are not secret. Michael Gilson de Lemos (MG to his friends), LNC Regional Representative from the Southeast US, posted to his Regional Email list the draft minutes of the May 23 LNC Executive Committee Meeting. Attached to those minutes was a pair of letters identified as an email exchange between Harry Browne and long-time LP activist Mary Gingell. The emails were supplied to the Executive Committee by Gingell's husband, LNC member Joe Dehn.
I quote from the emails (edited to delete email addresses and one personal reference):
—————
From: "Mary Gingell"
To: "Harry Browne"
Saturday, May 12, 2001 1:25 AM
Hi, Harry.
It occurs to me that now that Perry's memo is being broadcast around the country, the following question is sure to come up - is the fact that this memo can be found on the harrybrowne.org website an indication that you concur with Perry's opinion that violating the LPC conflict of interest rules in 1996 in order to help the Browne for President campaign is justifiable? And even if you don't believe that allowing him to post this memo on your website is an implicit endorsement of it, what, in fact, is your position on the issue?
So I guess I am asking it . . . as someone who defended him, and Winter, and Sharon, and you during that time and assured people that they were not, in fact, in violation of the policy. I would appreciate knowing how you felt about it then, and how you feel about it now.
————-
From: "Harry Browne"
To: "Mary Gingell"
Date: Tue, 15 May 2001 00:29:47 -0500
Dear Mary:
Sorry for the delay in getting back to you.
I'll be issuing a statement in the next couple of days. I imagine it will find its way to you.
In the meantime, you should know that I was aware of Perry's actions and agreed to them.
Harry
——————-
These two messages substantially remove doubt that Browne had approved his campaign's covert transactions with Perry Willis.
Substantial additional evidence was recently supplied by John Famularo. Famularo provides an extensive list of email exchanges between Willis and the Browne campaign team. Given that their genuineness has not been questioned to date, the exchanges show that Willis continually participated in managing Browne's 1996 campaign throughout all of 1995 and 1996, and that Browne's campaign team knew he was doing so. A series of late February, 1996 documents confirm that Browne was personally aware: Willis was preparing the co-called 'Ladbroke' fundraising letter. In an exchange with Willis, a person who, from his statements, clearly appears to be Browne edited and commented on the writing.
Further revelations came from Stuart Reges, Senior Lecturer at the University of Arizona and the Browne Campaign's accountant. In a message dated Sunday, May 20, Reges sent the email list lpus-misc@dehnbase.org a long statement with the topic "Famularo", including the pointed observation:
"John Famularo tried to warn me on several occasions that there were things going on that I didn't know about. I wouldn't say that I disbelieved John, but in the absence of anything specific, it was difficult to take him too seriously. Now that John has produced the invoice from Perry Willis, I have to admit that he was right that I was working with people who were keeping things from me.
"I did the accounting for the two Browne campaigns, so I know a lot about where the money went. I did not know until a week ago that Perry had continued to work for the campaign even after the LNC forbade him from doing so. They paid him through Jack Dean's consulting firm so that I wouldn't know about it and wouldn't include it on the FEC reports. I also didn't know that he'd lied about it all these years. I'm very disappointed in Perry and I told him so."
There is some evidence that Reges's words must be taken strictly literally. Famularo recalled to the author a conversation he says he had with Reges in 1996. In the course of a longer discussion, Famularo asserts that Reges indicated that "at a Browne campaign meeting (we) were discussing whether Perry would be able to 'put this one past the LNC executive committee'. Reges and some of the others were skeptical but Perry assured them that he "had them in the palm of the hand". From the conversation, Willis was involved in Browne campaign meetings, and Reges knew that he was involved, but from Reges's statements Reges did not know that Willis was working for pay.
One Short Invoice
The 1996 Invoice and Willis's confession tear the veil from a complex series of under-the-table financial and consulting arrangements. In 1996, it appeared that Harry Browne had won the Libertarian Party's Presidential nomination by open, fair, vigorous campaigning. The truth is apparently different. Browne's 2000 campaign manager, Perry Willis, now admits that Browne won the 1996 nomination because Browne made at least one illicit payment of laundered money to the Libertarian Party's National Director, one Perry Willis. Corresponding to the payments, Willis violated Party rules to rescue Browne's campaign from imminent catastrophe. Without Willis's actions, Browne would have been defeated in 1996.
Browne's 1996 campaign had opponents—Rick Tompkins, Irwin Schiff, and Doug Ohmen. These other campaigns professed, perhaps for the good of the Party, that this was an honest race. Many of their supporters believed them. In fact, Browne's opponents were in a crooked contest, in which they played by one set of rules while Harry Browne and his campaign played by another.
Supporters of Tompkins, Schiff, and Ohmen thought they were paying dues to support a neutral National staff that treated their candidates the same way it treated candidate Harry Browne. They were instead paying dues to support a National Director who was hard at work campaigning against Tompkins, Schiff, and Ohmen and campaigning for Browne. Through clever arrangements, the Browne campaign had the use of Perry Willis's professional services for mere thousands of dollars, while the National Committee paid Willis a living wage. Furthermore, it has recently been learned from an unexamined part of the public record that—prior to the convention—the LNC gave Browne direct financial support worth more than $10,000.
Did Willis's efforts truly give Browne the nomination? That's a bit less clear. You can't beat someone with no one. To some ears, Tompkins was perhaps a bit sharp. Schiff's income tax agenda, while reflecting a Libertarian desire for lower taxes, really had a very different intellectual basis than the Party Platform. Ohmen had campaigned in California, Colorado, and Pennsylvania. Browne's opponents raised much less money than Browne did. One of the reasons that Browne's opponents did not raise more money was that Browne's fundraising machine had already used Willis's letters to vacuum it up. Another reason that Browne raised more money is that in the first half of 1996 Browne had the use of the LNC mailing list without having to pay for it until he won the nomination.
If Browne's campaign had collapsed, the strong points of the Tompkins, Schiff, and Ohmen campaigns would have been more visible. Even if Browne's active contenders appear too weak to have won, nature abhors a political vacuum. Other contenders might have emerged.
Indeed, someone else was campaigning. Someone who was a good speaker. Someone who had visited large numbers of state conventions. Someone who had already won the strong support of many Libertarians. Someone whose campaign slogan was remembered by the Libertarian masses.
The slogan?
"Just say Jo"
If Browne had withdrawn, 1996 Vice Presidential aspirant Jo Jorgenson would have automatically been a credible Presidential possibility.
Finally...
The dominoes do not stop falling in 1996. In 1998 Browne used his reputation from the 1996 nomination to install a supportive National Chair and National Committee staff. Browne's 1998 activities helped Browne and his new campaign committee capture the 2000 Presidential Nomination, and helped his supporters to retain control of the National Committee.
These are current events, not ancient history. The cabal that gave the Party Browne in 1996, Browne in 2000, and much in between is still alive, still active, still using the same interesting fundraising and campaign tactics, and still working to repeat their machinations in 2004. This book will discuss what Libertarians received for their 1996-2000 investments in a National Party and two National Campaigns.